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Book Notes

CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERA TIONIN CONGRESS: THE IMPACTOF
JUDICIAL REVIEW INA SEPARATED SYSTEM. BY J. MITCHELL
PICKERILL. DURHAM, N.C.: DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2004. Pp.
xiii + 153. Appendices, notes, bibliography, index. USD$74.95 cloth,
USD$21.95 paperback.
BY TIMOTHY FITZSIMMONS
The authority of the United States Supreme Court to judicially
review acts of the U.S. Congress is not found in the U.S. Constitution, but
was established in Marbury v. Madison and reaffirmed in Cooperv. Aaron.
In Constitution Deliberationin Congress, Professor Pickerill examines the
exercise of this power and the resulting legislative "dialogue" between the
Congress and the Supreme Court.
Congressional responses to the striking down of legislation have
ranged from indifference (after the Court invalidated one-house legislative
vetoes over administrative agency decisions in INS v. Chadha), to reversal
(Congress amended the U.S. Constitution after the Court struck down the
Voting Rights Act in Oregon v. Mitchell), to acceptance, when Congress
amended or repealed and re-enacted the legislation in question.
By examining case law, testimony, debates, speeches, voting records,
and in interviews with current and former members of Congress, Pickerill
considers how the Court's review has impacted Congress's consideration of
constitutional issues. Further, Pickerill focuses on the decisions and judicial
scrutiny of the Rehnquist Court regarding state sovereignty and the
limitations of federal power. Pickerill traces this renewed scrutiny-which
the author says came after a 60-year period of "darkness of judicial
deference"-in four pieces of legislation: the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(1990), the Brady Bill (1994), the Violence Against Women Act (1994), and
the Hate Crimes Bill (not enacted).
While the Rehnquist Court may be more active in scrutinizing the
Federal Government's exercise of power, Pickerill illustrates that for
lawmakers-all of whom are concerned about getting elected and reelected-constitutional deliberation is at the bottom of a long list of
legislative and political concerns. For example, one member of Congress
summed up the lawmaking process this way: "Policy issues first ... six other
things, then constitutionality."
However, despite the political machinations that go into lawmaking,
Pickerill demonstrates that there is a continuing dialogue between Congress
and the Court. It is a subtle, routine, and on-going process, in which both
institutions play important roles in a system of divided powers.

